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It would appear that for the most part the election went well as far as vote counting goes, but there are some exceptions. Of course, with some of the vulnerabilities of electronic voting, we wouldn't know, or be able to prove, if it hadn't. Here's a possible solution, based largely on the Wired News article I linked to last time:

The key to this approach is that it is a hybrid between the current electronic touchscreen voting machines and the optical scanning machines. The voter still approaches an electronic machine that may look similar to current machines. He makes his selections, and is shown a summary of his choices for verification. However, unlike current touch-screen machines that also count the votes, this machine would then print out a paper ballot with the voter's selections indicated. The voter can double check the paper ballot to be sure that it reflects his choice, and then submits it. An optical scanner reads the paper ballots and counts the vote.

By taking this approach we have done a few important things. Not only have we added a paper trail to the process, but we've made voter verification of the paper trail an integral part. With the ballots being printed (with ink or toner, not on thermal paper, which can be easily ruined in a hot environment) you eliminate the readability and scanability issues that may occur when voters fill in optical scan ballots by hand. You also create a ballot that can easily be hand counted if there is need for either a recount or an audit of the optical scanning software that tabulates the votes, but is easily machine counted for quick results.

While I think this system shows some promise, it is not fleshed out to the point of being a viable solution on its own. There are still some weak points in the process; if the ballot is incorrect, we must be sure that the incorrect ballot is destroyed before we will print a replacement that will actually be cast. However, the overall integrity of the vote can be more easily verified by this system than with our often-paperless electronic voting equipment that is currently in use. Further, since the counting system is separated from the ballot casting process, we (hopefully) do not have to throw out an entire machine's worth of votes if we find something amiss. One bad apple can not effectively disenfranchise the local populace.

As I said in my last post, we need to be asking questions about the integrity of the electronic voting machines that are being deployed across the nation. We need to be sure that the people who are making decisions know about the potential drawbacks and are not just basing their decisions on the dog-and-pony shows that the vendors put on. I know there's been a lot of light shed on this area lately, but just because our recent election seems to have gone well doesn't mean that we don't need to look hard at improving the current situation. I'm afraid that some people will assume all is well and let this issue slip into obscurity until proof of a larger problem exists. At that point it may be too late to do much without spending more money on a make-up election or new machines to replace recent purchases, both potential wastes of tax-payer money.

If you want to get involved, I suggest you start with E-voting state by state to find out what machines are being used in your state, and who is making the decisions on future voting system purchases and implementation. Making your voice heard on election day is important. You need to make your voice heard now to be sure that the vote that is counted is the vote that you cast.

—Jack